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Barbara J. Fick is an associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School in Notre Dame, Ind.;
fick.l@nd.edu

Act (FLSA) requires
employers to pay workers
minimum wage and overtime and allows employees to sue employers to
collect unpaid wages due
in either federal or state
court. The federal
removal statute permits a
defendant to remove a
lawsuit filed in state
court to federal court,
where the federal court
would have original jurisdiction, unless Congress
expressly provided
against such removal.
The lower federal courts'
are divided over whether
the FLSA contains such
an express provision
against removal.
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Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.
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ISSUE
Does the language of the FLSA providing that "an action ...
may be
maintained ...
in any federal or state

court" constitute an express provision prohibiting removal to federal
court when the plaintiff has chosen
to maintain its lawsuit in state
court?

FACTS
Phillip Breuer was an employee of
Jim's Concrete. He claimed that the
employer failed to pay him overtime
and filed a lawsuit against Jim's
Concrete in Florida state court. The
employer removed the case to federal court pursuant to the federal
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). Breuer filed a motion with
the federal district court to remand
the case back to state court. The
district court denied the motion but
permitted Breuer to file an interlocutory appeal with the circuit
court.

The Eleventh Circuit granted
Breuer's petition for an interlocutory appeal to decide the issue of
whether Congress expressly provided that an FLSA action, once started in state court, could not be
removed to federal court. It then
affirmed the decision of the district
court denying the motion for
remand. It held that the language of
the FLSA did not contain the explicit statutory directive prohibiting
removal that is required by the federal removal statute. 292 F.3d 1308
(11th Cir. 2002).
Breuer filed a petition for writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which the Court granted. 123 S.Ct.
816, 154 L. Ed. 2d 767 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The arguments in this case are
focused on the meanings of two
statutory phrases-one contained
in the FLSA and one in the
federal removal statute. Section
16(b) of the FLSA provides, in
pertinent part:

BREUER V JIM'S CONCRETE
OF BREVARD, INC.
DOCKET No. 02-337
ARGUMENT DATE:
APRIL 2, 2003
FROM: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

An action to recover liability ...
may be maintained against any
employer ... in any Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 1441(a) of the federal
removal statute provides:
Except as otherwise expressly
provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts
of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant ...
The employer argues that § 1441(a)
specifically requires that a statute
contain an express provision precluding removal. The FLSA contains
no such express prohibition. Rather,
the words "may be maintained" are
ambiguous: they could be interpreted to refer to either beginning a lawsuit or continuing a lawsuit. Such
ambiguity cannot be considered a
specific expression by Congress of
an intent to prevent removal.
While agreeing with the employer
that the phrase "may be maintained" is ambiguous, Breuer draws
a much different conclusion from
that ambiguity. Breuer asserts that
removal jurisdiction should be narrowly construed in order to give due
deference to state power to determine controversies. This federalism
principle was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in its decision in
Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313
U.S. 100 (1941), in which the Court
held that given due regard for the
independence of state governments,
federal courts should confine their
jurisdiction to the precise limits of
the statute. This principle was reiterated just this term in Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson,
123 S.Ct. 366 (2002), with the
Court holding that removal statutes
should be strictly construed.
Therefore, ambiguity should be construed against removal, not in its
favor.

Moreover, the term "maintain"
encompasses not only the commencement of a lawsuit, but also its
continuation to conclusion. This is
the way the Supreme Court defined
the term in Smallwood v. Gallardo,
275 U.S. 56, 61 (1927). Thus, §
16(b) of the FLSA gives the plaintiff
the right to commence his lawsuit
in state court and continue prosecuting that lawsuit in state court to
its conclusion.
This was the position taken by the
Administrator of the Wage-Hour
Division of the Department of Labor
(the official responsible for enforcing the FLSA). In a brief filed in
Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.Supp.
87 (8th Cir. 1947) (the only other
circuit court case to have decided
this exact issue), the Administrator
argued that by using the word
"maintain" in § 16(b), Congress
did not intend to permit removal
of an FLSA action. The Eighth
Circuit agreed with this position
and remanded the case back to
state court.
The employer counters that the persuasive force of the Johnson decision was undercut when Congress, a
year later, amended the federal
removal statute to include the
phrase "except as otherwise
expressly provided." The Eighth
Circuit had inferred a prohibition
on removal from the "may be maintained" language, but by subsequently amending the removal
statute Congress signaled that such
prohibitions on removal must be
expressly stated. Basing a decision
regarding congressional intent on
inference is a different exercise than
looking for an express statement
contained in a statute, and it is the
latter that the amended removal
statute requires.
Breuer argues that Congress itself
distinguishes between the terms
"bring" and "maintain" in other

parts of the United States code.
Therefore, congressional use of the
term "maintain" in the FLSA does
constitute an express provision
against removal. When Congress
wants to authorize the institution of
civil litigation, it uses the terms
"bring," "commence," or "file."
Whereas when Congress wants to
bar the commencement of litigation,
as well as to terminate pending litigation, it uses the term "maintain."
Thus, Congress itself has used the
word "maintain" to refer to ongoing
action and not merely the beginning
of such action. Thus, the use of the
phrase "may be maintained" in the
FLSA to mean continuing the case
to conclusion is consistent with
congressional meaning in other
statutes.
In the FLSA itself, this distinction
between "bring" and "maintain" is
recognized. Under § 16(c), the right
of an employee to "bring" a lawsuit
terminates if the Secretary of Labor
files an action. However, the courts
consistently have held that this provision does not require termination
of pending lawsuits brought by
employees before the Secretary of
Labor has filed an action.
The employer, on the other hand,
points to other provisions in the
U.S. code in which Congress prohibited removal. In these provisions,
Congress used direct, unequivocal
language, clearly stating in the
statute itself that the lawsuit may
not be removed to any district
court. The language of § 16(b) providing that an action may be maintained in state court falls far short
of an express statement that an
FLSA action may not be removed.
Breuer notes that the FLSA prohibition on removal preceded the §
1441(a) revision. Thus it is not surprising that the FLSA does not use
the express language contained in
(Continued on Page 340)
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statutes enacted subsequent to the
revisions. In any case, the federal
removal statute requires only that a
statute expressly provide that
removal is not permitted; this is
not the same as saying the statute
must expressly state removal is
prohibited. Section 16(b) contains
such an express provision by stating
that actions may be maintained in
state court.
Moreover, the purpose behind the
congressional revision to § 1441(a)
was to make clear that there are
exceptions to the removability of
claims, not to expand removal jurisdiction. At the time of the revision,
the prevailing interpretation of the
FLSA was that it precluded removal.
To read the revision to § 1441(a) as
now allowing for removal of FLSA
claims would be to expand removal
jurisdiction, which is inconsistent
with both the congressional intent
behind the revision as well as the
federalism principles enunciated in
Shamrock Oil.
The prohibition on removal of FLSA
claims was consistent with the practicalities of litigating such cases during the early decades after its enactment. The amounts in contention
were relatively small-most of the
early cases involved claims for less
than $250. Permitting removal to
federal courts would have greatly
increased the expense of litigation,
often resulting in the cost of
pursuing the claim outweighing the
benefit of winning. At the time,
state courts were in easy proximity
to most people, whereas federal
courts could be hundreds of miles
distant, adding to both time and
cost. Moreover, litigation in federal
courts tended to be slower as there
were significantly fewer federal than
state judges.
The employer asserts that even if
there are sensible policy reasons for
prohibiting removal, it is for

Congress, and not the courts, to
choose among competing policies
and implement those choices it
deems appropriate. If Congress had
wished to give plaintiffs an absolute
choice of forum, it could have done
so in unmistakable terms consistent
with its pronouncement in the federal removal statute that express
provision is required.
Breuer counters that legislative history suggests that Congress thought
it had prohibited removal in the
FLSA. In 1958 Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 1445(c), which barred the
removal of workers' compensation
cases. In discussing this provision, a
Senate Committee Report noted
that the FLSA gives workers the
option of filing a case in either state
or federal court, and that if filed in
state court the law prohibits
removal to federal court.
The employer, in response, points
out that the context of that Senate
report was a debate regarding diversity jurisdiction, not a discussion of
either the FLSA or § 1441. It is a
tangential comment by a Congress,
different from the one that enacted
either the FLSA or the revision to
the removal statute. The best evidence of the meaning of a statute is
the text of the statute itself, and not
legislative history, particularly of a
different Congress.

is heard, or will the defendant have
the final say? Where a case is heard
can indeed affect the course of the
litigation: case backlogs differ,
which affects how long it takes to
get to court; the composition of the
jury pool differs, which can affect
the makeup of the jury that hears
the case; the procedural rules governing the course of litigation differ;
and as a result of these differences,
the expense of pursuing litigation
may differ. The substantive law governing the claim, however, will be
the same regardless of whether the
case is litigated in state or federal
court.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Philip T. Breuer (Donald E.
Pinaud, Jr. (904) 398-1229)
For Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.
(Andrew S. Hament (321) 6743049)

SIGNIFICANCE
This is fundamentally a case about
principles of statutory interpretation. Aqhile the outcome of the case
will directly affect only litigation
under the FLSA, the principles
applied by the Court in resolving
the case may prove useful in other
cases requiring statutory analysis.
The impact of this case on FLSA litigation will be confined to choice of
forum-will the plaintiff be able to
effectively choose where his lawsuit
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